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\DOI{10.5802/crgeos.311}
\datereceived{2024-12-23}
\daterevised{2025-08-11}
\dateaccepted{2025-08-22}
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\dateposted{2025-11-28}
\begin{document}

\begin{noXML}

\TopicFR{D\'eveloppement durable, am\'enagement}
\TopicEN{Sustainable development, landscaping}

\CDRsetmeta{articletype}{review}

\title{Economy-wide but fragile decreases in greenhouse gas emissions
supported by climate policy in France} 

\alttitle{Baisses fragiles des \'{e}missions de gaz \`{a} effet dans
l'ensemble de l'\'{e}conomie soutenues par la politique climatique en
France}

\author{\firstname{Corinne} \lastname{Le Qu\'{e}r\'{e}}\CDRorcid{0000-0003-2319-0452}}

\address{School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia,
Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK}
\email{c.lequere@uea.ac.uk}

\thanks{UK's Royal Society through a Research Professorship (grant
RSRP\textbackslash R\textbackslash 241002)} 

\begin{abstract} 
France is among the growing group of countries that have succeeded in
decreasing their emissions of fossil fuel CO\textsubscript{2} over the past
decade while growing their economy. All five largest emissions sectors
contributed substantially to the national decrease in emissions, making
France one of the few countries to have reached economy-wide
decarbonisation. Here I show, based on annual progress reports of the
French High Council on Climate published during 2019--2025, that this
decarbonisation has paralleled the expansion and general strengthening
of climate policy and governance in France during the past two decades.
A close look at recent emissions trends and the evolution of climate
policy in key areas (Governance and Strategy, Public Policy
Instruments, Just Transition) suggests achieving its 2030 target is
plausible but only if setbacks in climate policy support during
2024--2025 are quickly redressed so that the implementation of actions
can accelerate within the French and European frameworks. The
trajectory beyond 2030 towards Net Zero in 2050 is not yet secured for
France due to the long-term misalignment between electricity generation and
expected demand, and to uncertainties in the availability of forest carbon sinks
which are weakened by climate change. The example of France shows that
climate policy can evolve organically to provide increasing clarity and
support for economy-wide action over decades, and that progress can
unfold despite suboptimal levels of support and inefficiencies in
public policy. The general strengthening of climate policies in the
past two decades does not guarantee continued strengthening in the
future.
\vspace*{-2pt}
\end{abstract}

\begin{altabstract}
La France fait partie du groupe croissant de pays qui ont r\'eussi \`a
r\'eduire leurs \'emissions de CO\textsubscript{2} issues des combustibles
fossiles au cours de la derni\`ere d\'ecennie tout en assurant la
croissance de leur \'economie. Les cinq plus
grands secteurs \'{e}metteurs ont tous contribu\'{e} de mani\`{e}re
significative \`{a} la diminution nationale des \'{e}missions, faisant
de la France l'un des rares pays \`{a} avoir atteint une
d\'{e}carbonisation \`{a} l'\'{e}chelle de l'\'{e}conomie. Je montre
ici, sur la base des rapports annuels du Haut conseil pour le climat
publi\'{e}s entre 2019 et 2025, que cette d\'{e}carbonisation s'est
effectu\'{e}e en parall\`{e}le de l'expansion et du renforcement
g\'{e}n\'{e}ral des politiques et de la gouvernance climatiques en
France au cours des deux derni\`{e}res d\'{e}cennies. Une analyse
approfondie des tendances en \'{e}missions et des politiques publiques
concernant les axes cl\'{e}s (Gouvernance et strat\'{e}gie, Instruments
de politique publique, Transition juste), sugg\`{e}re que l'objectif de
2030 est accessible mais seulement \`{a} condition de reprendre un cap
ambitieux, suite aux glissements des soutiens politiques de 2024--2025.
La trajectoire au-del\`{a} de 2030 vers la neutralit\'{e} carbone en
2050 n'est pas s\'{e}curis\'{e}e en raison d'un d\'{e}salignement entre
la production et la demande d'\'{e}lectricit\'{e} sur cette
p\'{e}riode, ainsi que des incertitudes concernant la disponibilit\'{e}
des puits de carbone forestiers, affaiblis par le changement
climatique. L'exemple de la France montre que les politiques
climatiques peuvent \'{e}voluer de mani\`{e}re organique pour offrir
une visibilit\'{e} et un soutien accrus aux actions sur plusieurs
d\'{e}cennies, mais les actions pass\'{e}es ne garantissent pas la
continuation du renforcement des politiques climatiques dans l'avenir.
\end{altabstract}

\keywords{\kwd{GHG emissions}
\kwd{CO\textsubscript{2} emissions}
\kwd{Climate policy}
\kwd{Climate change}}

\altkeywords{\kwd{\'{E}missions de gaz \`{a} effet de serre (GES)}
\kwd{\'{E}missions de CO\textsubscript{2}} \kwd{Politique climatique}
\kwd{Changement climatique}}

\editornote{Article submitted by invitation}
%\alteditornote{Article soumis sur invitation}

\maketitle

\vspace*{-1pt}

\twocolumngrid

\end{noXML}

\defcitealias{HCC2024b}{ibid.}
\defcitealias{HCC2024a}{ibid.}

\let\rmmu\upmu

\section{Introduction}\label{mark1}

Global emissions of fossil CO\tsub{2} were still rising in 2024, 
jeopardizing the chances of limiting climate change in the
1.5--2~\textdegree C range enshrined in the Paris climate agreement
\citep{Friedlingsteinetal2025,UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammeetal2024}.
However, the continued rise in global emissions masks progress in the
underlying drivers of emissions at the national and regional level.
Progress in tackling climate change has directly reduced the growth in
global fossil CO\tsub{2} emissions from its height of nearly 3\% per
year in the 2000s, to 0.7\% per year in the past decade (2015--2024).
The slower growth rate in recent years has been attributed to the
success of public climate and energy policies, which accounted for
emissions savings of 5.9 billion tonnes of CO\tsub{2} {(GtCO}\tsub{2}) in
2016 \citep{EskanderFankhauser2020}, reducing global emissions by 15\%
that year. Likewise, an estimate of avoided emissions from the
deployment of renewable energy suggests 9.8 GtCO\tsub{2} were avoided in
2024, reducing global emissions by 21\% \citep{Dengetal2025}. Avoided
emissions in turn led to avoided possible warming levels exceeding
5~\textdegree C this Century that were still plausible a decade ago
\citep{Friedlingsteinetal2014}. The slower growth in global CO\tsub{2}
emissions in the past decade is driven by changes in most large
countries and regions, including China, India, and non-OECD countries
in aggregate, where emissions grew more slowly, and the European Union
(EU) and OECD countries in aggregate, where emissions decreased more
rapidly. Emissions continued to decrease in the US in the past decade,
but at a similar rate as the previous decade. 


{Notably, 22 upper-middle to high-income countries have succeeded in
decreasing their fossil CO\tsub{2} emissions significantly while also
growing their economies, up from 18 countries a decade ago,
representing 23\% of world fossil CO\tsub{2} emissions}
\citep{Friedlingsteinetal2025,LeQuereetal2019}. In order to add up to
changes substantial enough to reverse the rise in global fossil
CO\tsub{2} {emissions, lessons learned during the progressive
decarbonisation of these 22 countries would need to propagate rapidly
to other countries. The sharing of insights is limited at present, as
this group of leaders in the decarbonisation space has only expanded by
four countries in a decade, while there are 38 countries in the OECD
group of countries which are generally wealthy with well-developed
physical and social infrastructures, and there are nearly 200 countries
worldwide that will also need to decarbonise their energy systems
eventually.} 

{Three factors recur to explain decarbonisation trends in leading
decarbonising countries} \citep{LeQuereetal2019}: First, these
countries generally used decreasing energy levels either through
efficiencies or absolute reductions in energy use. Second, the
deployment of renewable energy in these countries replaced fossil
energy, while in countries with emissions still rising, renewable
energy often increased alongside fossil energy. Lastly, countries that
had the largest number of climate and energy policies had bigger
emissions cuts. This last point was evidenced by correlation only
rather than causation, however the direct role of policy was later
confirmed in a separate study \citep{EskanderFankhauser2020}. The
switch from coal and oil to gas played a relatively minor role in most
countries, apart from the USA. 

{Very few countries have succeeded in setting in motion economy-wide
decarbonisation} \citep{Lambetal2022,Lambetal2021}. The dominant factor
of decarbonisation has been the move away from coal for electricity
generation in the leading decarbonising countries, replaced mainly by
renewable energy and to a lesser extent by gas. For example for the UK,
which has cut its emissions in half since 1990, the switch from coal to
renewables accounts for 79\% of the country's decrease in fossil
CO\tsub{2} emissions. Likewise in the EU in aggregate, the decrease in
coal use in power generation accounts for 80\% of the decrease in
CO\tsub{2} {emissions, while in the US it accounts for more than 100\%,
as the other sectors increased their emissions while coal use reduced
its emissions by 64\%. However, many countries now face the challenges
of decarbonising the whole economy. This is either because their
electricity has historically been relatively low-carbon, such as France
whose electricity is produced predominantly by nuclear reactors (share
of 65--70\%) and Canada where it is produced predominantly by
hydroelectricity (60--65\%), or because they have closed down all (as
the UK) or most (as the USA) of the, often aging, coal-fired power
stations.} 

{Here I detail how France has succeeded in setting in motion its
economy-wide decarbonisation and in maintaining decreases in CO}\tsub{2}
{emissions over two decades, from a baseline with relatively low coal
use for electricity generation and hence relatively low per capita
emissions (5.5 tCO}\tsub{2}{e/person in 2023) compared to other
high-income economies and to the world average (6.5
tCO}\tsub{2}{e/person; HCC 2025). Consumption emissions from imported
goods and services in France, although 1.7 times higher than
territorial emissions (9.4 tCO}\tsub{2}{e/person in 2023), are also
decreasing in parallel to territorial emissions since 2008 \citep{HCC2025}.
This analysis is largely based on the progress reports of France's High
Council on Climate (HCC) and on CO\tsub{2} emissions data collated by
the Global Carbon Project's annual Global Carbon Budget update and
associated insights.} 


\section{{Decreases in emissions in France and in other decarbonising
countries}}

\subsection{Sustained decarbonisation in France for 20~years}\label{mark2.1}

France's GHG emissions began to decrease around 2005, as for many other
countries. Its decarbonisation rate has been fairly constant, averaging
9.3 MtCO\tsub{2}e/year on average (${-}$1.8\%/year) during the decade
2005--2014 and 9.9 MtCO\tsub{2}e/year (${-}$2.4\%/year) during
2015--2024 (Figure~\ref{fig1}; trends \mbox{calculated} as linear fit through
2004--2014). These rates are comparable at 7.9 MtCO\tsub{2}e/year
(${-}$1.7\%/year) and 9.7 MtCO\tsub{2}{e/year (${-}$2.5\%/year) when
including the CO}\tsub{2} sinks from the land sector (LULUCF) for each
decade, respectively. This decarbonisation pathway has been maintained
for 20 years, with emissions at 369 MtCO\tsub{2}e in 2024 (332
MtCO\tsub{2}{e including LULUCF). The last few years since 2019 have
shown some signs of acceleration up to 2024, backed by enhanced policy
support, but this acceleration needs policy continuity at the French
and European level to be maintained} \citep{HCC2024a}. 


\begin{figure}
\includegraphics{fig01}
\caption{\label{fig1}Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in France during
1990--2024 in million tonnes of equivalent CO\tsub{2} per year
(MtCO\tsub{2}e/year). Emissions are shown for all GHG and emitting
sectors in France, excluding (in black) or including (in brown) the
carbon sink from the land use, land use change and forestry sector
(LULUCF). Source: \citet{Citepa2025}.}
\end{figure}


\subsection{Sustained decarbonisation in 22 countries, with France in
the middle}\label{mark2.2}

The rate of decarbonisation in France sits close to the middle of the
countries that have decarbonised their economy in the decade
2014--2023, just above the rate observed over the EU in aggregate
(Figure~\ref{fig2}). These are compared for their fossil CO\tsub{2}
{emissions only (including fossil fuels and process emissions such as
cement), which are available for all countries up to the year 2023
through the Global Carbon Budget annual emissions update}
\citep{Friedlingsteinetal2025}.~This group contains the 22 upper-middle
to high-income countries that have statistically significant
decarbonisation of their fossil CO\tsub{2} emissions while also having
statistically significant increases in their Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). Of that group of 22 countries, five countries have decarbonised
at notably faster rates of 3\% per year on average, while some
countries like the US decarbonise consistently but slowly around a rate
of 1\% per year. Somalia also decreased its emissions while growing its
GDP, but it is excluded from the comparison here because it is
low-income and not comparable to other countries in that group. 

\begin{figure}
\includegraphics{fig02}
\caption{\label{fig2}Decrease in CO\tsub{2} emissions of fossil origin
during the decade 2014--2023 (in percent). The 22 countries are
subdivided in three groups for comparison in the text. EU27 in
aggregate is also shown. France is highlighted with a black
contour.}
\end{figure}


\subsection{CO$_{2}$ emissions decreases among countries uncorrelated
to GDP growth in the past decade}\label{mark2.3}

Fossil CO\tsub{2} emissions decreased 24\% in France in the decade
2014--2023 while its economy grew 11\% (Figure~\ref{fig3}). While weak
economic growth can temporarily reduce energy demand and associated
emissions, long-term decarbonisation trends need to decouple from
long-term economic growth to enable economies to flourish while
tackling climate change. There is no significant correlation between
the \mbox{decrease} in emissions and growth in GDP among the 22 leading
decarbonisation countries ($r=0.30$, $p=0.18$), indicating at a minimum
that weaker growth in GDP does not account for stronger decarbonisation
trends, and conversely that strong decarbonisation trends can be
delivered in the presence of strong economic growth. Among the seven
countries that decarbonised the fastest (top third; Figure~\ref{fig2}),
GDP grew by 20\% or more over a decade in Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands, and between 10\% and 20\% in the UK, Finland, and
Germany. The average GDP growth among these seven countries (19\%) is
very close to the GDP growth of all 22 countries (22\%), also
demonstrating the low relevance of GDP growth in setting
decarbonisation trends among those countries.

\begin{figure*}
{\vspace*{-4pt}}
\includegraphics{fig03}
\caption{\label{fig3} Change emissions and GDP in the past decade
(2014--2023; percent). (left) Fossil CO\tsub{2} emissions, (middle) GDP,
and (right) CO\tsub{2} emissions estimated based on consumption
accounting. Values are referenced at 100\% in 2013. France is shown in
black, the average of the 22 decarbonising countries in purple, and the
average of the seven countries decarbonising the fastest in blue. Data
is from the Global Carbon Budget 2024 \citep{Friedlingsteinetal2025}
using GDP based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) from the International
Energy Agency (IEA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). No data
for consumption emissions is available for Gabon.} 
{\vspace*{-4pt}}
\end{figure*}

\subsection{CO$_{2}$ emissions on a consumption-basis also decrease in
parallel to territorial emissions when accounting for the origin of
imports}\label{mark2.4}

{In some cases, decreases in emissions can be indicative of changes in
economic structure, leading to leakages of emissions in other
countries, rather than true decarbonisation of the economy.
Consumption-based emissions include emissions associated with imports
of goods and services produced in other countries for consumption in a
given country, minus the exports (also called ``carbon footprint''). In
contrast, territorial-based emissions used widely, including here and
by the UN as a basis for a country's climate objectives, occur on the
national territory. Consumption-based emissions provide one measure to
test for the possible importance of leakages. However, for countries
that decarbonise, it is expected that trends in consumption emissions
will be less than trends in territorial emissions if part of their
imports come from countries where emissions still grow, such as most
emerging economies including China and India. Hence lower decreases in
consumption-based emissions do not necessarily mean a lack of progress
or leakage of emissions elsewhere as it can also be indicative of lags
in decarbonisation profiles among countries.} 

For example, half of France's consumption-based emissions comes from
imports, a fraction that has remained relatively constant for the past
two decades \citep{HCC2023a}. Of those imported emissions, about 30\%
come from the EU, the UK and the USA who have decarbonising profiles
somewhat similar to France (Figure~\ref{fig2}), about 35\% come from
China and other Asian countries, while the remaining ${\sim}$35\% is
distributed among other countries (the Middle East, Russia, Africa,
South America) \citep{HCC2020}. If imports remain the same and the
emissions trends typical of these regions are applied to their
respective fractions of imports, the expected decrease in consumption
emissions for France corresponding to the decrease in territorial
emissions of ${-}24\%$ during 2014--2023 would be ${-}11\%$, so less than
half. Likewise, a country whose consumption emissions remain flat while
its territorial emissions decrease does not mean a lack of progress,
because part of the difference will certainly reflect growing emissions
in the imported fraction offsetting decarbonisation at the national
level. 

{The decrease in territorial CO\tsub{2} emissions in France parallels
the decrease in consumption emissions over the 2013--2021 period, when
data were available (Figure~\ref{fig3}). Territorial CO\tsub{2}
emissions decreased 15\% during this time period, while consumption
CO\tsub{2} {emissions decreased 11\%. The different rates here can be
accounted for by a slower decarbonisation profile in countries where
imports originate. Among the 21 decarbonising countries, there is a
significant correlation of $r=0.66$ between trends in consumption and
trends in territorial emissions, indicating that countries that
decarbonise the most do it both on consumption and on a territorial
basis, with the consumption trends on average 68\% of the territorial
trends (based on linear regression). Five countries decarbonise on a
territorial basis but not on a consumption basis at this stage
(Czechia, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, and South Korea), but in all
but one country (Slovenia) the different decarbonisation rates between
territorial and consumption-based emissions are 10\% or less and can be
partly explained by the emissions profiles in countries where imports
originate. Slovenia's large difference between the trends in
territorial (${-}14\%$) and consumption-based emissions (${+}15\%$) is
the only country of the group examined here where the leakage might
explain the decarbonisation, and further investigation would be needed
to find out.} 

The analysis above for both territorial and consumption-based
emissions suggests that for all countries but one, a strong case can be
made that real progress is taking place in decarbonising the economies
of a leading group of 21 countries (excluding Slovenia), five of which
have achieved decarbonisation rates exceeding 3\% per year sustained
for at least one decade (2014--2023). Over the same period, France's
decarbonisation rate of 2.4\% per year on average (for fossil CO\tsub{2}
only) has been achieved by spreading decarbonisation efforts across
the economy. Its climate policy framework and sectoral emissions
profile are presented in sections below to extract insights that may be
useful more broadly. 


\section{France's climate policy}\label{mark3}

\subsection{Evolving climate policy within the EU framework}

{The summary provided here gives a brief overview of the organisation
of climate action in France's public sector. It does not aim to be
comprehensive, but rather to give insights into the level of ambition,
and into the successes and failures of successive attempts to organise
climate action. This information is necessary to understand how France
has been able to establish economy-wide decarbonisation over two
decades, and to argue that it has done so successfully but
imperfectly.} 

National climate policies in France have been revised iteratively on
multiple occasions. Climate \mbox{policies} have been in place since at least
2004 with the publication of a Climate Plan (Figure~\ref{fig4}). The
plan turned into a programmatic law in 2005 that established the main
orientations for the energy sector for France (the POPE law). Plans and
laws have been revised iteratively on multiple occasions, with the
LTECV (energy transition for green growth law) of 2015 prescribing a
5-year process that included revisions of a National Low-Carbon
Strategy (SNBC) and a Pluriannual Energy Program (PPE), and the
associated publications of carbon budget objectives limiting France's
GHG emissions in successive 5-year periods, 10 years ahead of time. The
long-term climate objective for France has converged on achieving net
zero in 2050 including all GHG, which was set in law within the Climate
and Energy law of 2019. This law also announced a ceiling for
International aviation and shipping and for consumption-based emissions
to be published within the third revision of the SNBC (SNBC3, currently
in draft form). Plans and laws have been accompanied by an increasingly
detailed set of sectoral objectives and implementation rules that have
provided additional visibility to climate legislations but not
necessarily clear orientations, with sectoral objectives often set
below what was needed to reach national climate objectives
\citep{HCC2021}. 


\begin{figure*}
\vspace*{4pt}
\includegraphics{fig04}
\vspace*{3pt}
\caption{\label{fig4} Main climate laws and plans in France since 2004.
Reproduced and updated from \citet{HCC2019}. See text for the
definition of acronyms.} 
\vspace*{3pt}
\end{figure*}

{Climate policy in France and the EU are closely intertwined, for the
benefit of both. France benefits from a strong and clear climate policy
framework in the EU, most recently set by the European Climate Law of
2021 and detailed in the Green Deal overarching policy and Fit for 55
detailed policy package. France was a central contributor to fleshing
out these policies, particularly while it held the EU presidency during
the first half of 2022. France also benefits from the European Trading
Scheme (ETS) which is instrumental in reducing energy and
industry-related emissions in the EU. Despite the strong EU framework
on climate change, France has struggled to keep up with the required
implementation of regulations decided jointly by France and other State
members at the EU level. For example, France's 2030 target set at the
EU level has not yet been translated into a national legal objective,
reducing clarity over the actual objective for 2030, which is only 5
years away. Likewise, the EU-wide standard for cars and vans is not in
the French legislation, causing some ambiguity about the needed level
of action\break in France.} 


\subsection{Evolving climate governance and democratic instruments}\label{mark3.2}

{France has put in place multiple democratic instruments to help guide
its climate policy. A long-standing organisation is the National
Council for Ecological Transition (CNTE), which evolved from the
committee established in 2010 to follow the Grenelle laws. The CNTE
brings together public and non-public organisations (including
Parliamentarians, unions, NGOs, and regional representatives) to give
advice on environmental and energy strategies. It is a solid
organisation of 58 members which is core to achieving national
consensus on climate action. Arguably the most influential instrument
in recent years has been the Citizen's Climate Convention (CCC).
Established in 2019 to get citizens' help to accelerate climate
actions, it brought together 150 randomly selected citizens during a
9-month period. Citizens were formed to climate change challenges and
asked to propose solutions. Their 150 solutions served as a basis for
the 2021 Climate and Resilience law. Other instruments included the
short-lived Ecological Defense Council (2019--2020) that reunited the
President, Prime Minister and 10 Ministers to address climate and
environmental issues, and the National Council for Refoundation that
aimed to concert more effectively on major challenges including climate
change.} 

France's governance has regularly been adjusted to manage its climate
ambition. It established a General Secretariat for the Ecological
Planification (SGPE) in 2022 to coordinate and implement France's
strategy for climate, energy, biodiversity and the circular economy.
This secretariat is under the responsibility of the Prime Minister,
hence benefiting from the highest level of governmental support. Since
its onset, it has greatly contributed to clarifying how France aims to
achieve its climate objectives, thus improving the cohesion within
government on climate action and helping to engage businesses and
industry in the transition. Notably, the Ministry of the Economy and
Finances has founded a sub-direction focused on how to finance the
ecological transition, and has committed to increasingly use the Green
Budget approach \citep{OECD2024} to orient spending towards
climate-favourable actions and away from fossil fuels.

France has also established an independent body, the High Council on
Climate (HCC), whose role is to evaluate public action on climate. The
HCC has published seven annual progress reports on climate action and
several thematic reports, including on consumption-based emissions
\citep{HCC2020}, the Energy Charter Treaty} \citep{HCC2022}, CCS
\citep{HCC2023b}, and agriculture and food systems \citep{HCC2024b}.
The government responded to each progress report and, according to the
HCC's analysis, most recommendations have been taken into account, at
least partially \citep{HCC2024b,HCC2024a}. Much of the analysis
presented here is drawn from the HCC's successive reports. 

\section{France's sectoral emissions and their evolution in time}\label{mark4}


\subsection{GHG emissions in France are distributed across the economy,
with transport the first emitting post}

France's electricity has been predominantly generated by nuclear power
since the mid-1980s, after a conscious effort to reduce exposure to
volatile energy prices following the 1973 oil crisis. Emissions from
electricity generation were only 10\% of total emissions in 1990, and
have come down to 3\% in 2024 (10~MtCO\tsub{2}e). Although
there is still some scope to reduce this contribution to zero or very
nearly, profound cuts in national emissions need to come from other
sectors. Emissions in France in 2024 were distributed across the
economy, with 34\% from transport (more than half from cars alone),
21\% from agriculture, 17\% from industry, 15\% from buildings, 9\% for
energy (including electricity, refineries, heat networks), and 4\% from
waste (Figure~\ref{fig5}). Proportionally in the past decade, buildings,
energy and to a lesser extent the industry sectors have reduced their
relative contribution to national emissions, while the transport,
agriculture and waste sectors have increased their relative
contribution. France also has a substantial forestry sector and large
carbon sinks, which offset around 10\% of the gross\break emissions.


\begin{figure}
\includegraphics{fig05}
\caption{\label{fig5} Distribution of GHG emissions in France among
sectors in 2024. Source: \citet{Citepa2025} \guillemotleft~Rapport 
Secten~\guillemotright.}
\end{figure}

\subsection{GHG emissions in France have decreased in all sectors but
the carbon sinks have deteriorated}\label{mark4.2}

GHG emissions have decreased by 100 MtCO\tsub{2}e (${-}21\%$; period of
2024 compared to the 2013--2025 average; Figure~\ref{fig6}; data:
\citet{Citepa2025}). During that period, GHG emissions have decreased in all
sectors (Figure~\ref{fig6}), with only the storage in carbon sinks
diminishing. Identifying the contributions of public policy to these
decreases is important to guide further action. Whereas a detailed
attribution cannot be made within the scope of this paper, some
indication is provided here of the likely policy and non-policy factors
that have most influenced sectoral emissions trajectories over the past
decade. Detailed attribution to policy would require a formal analysis
with counterfactuals, such as that identifying successful policy mixes
covering EU road transports\break \citep{Kochetal2022}, and the analysis of
the role of carbon pricing in power sector decarbonisation in the UK
\citep{Leroutier2022}.



\begin{figure}
{\vspace*{-4pt}}
\includegraphics{fig06}
\caption{\label{fig6} Change in sectoral GHG emissions and in the
carbon sinks in France in the past decade (MtCO\tsub{2}e). Positive
values in LULUCF indicate weaker carbon sinks. The 2013--2015 average is
used as reference to limit border effects. Source: \citet{Citepa2025} 
\guillemotleft~Rapport Secten~\guillemotright.}  
{\vspace*{-4pt}}
\end{figure}

Emissions in the transport sector decreased 13~MtCO\tsub{2}e
(${-}9.2\%$) only in the past decade (2024 relative to 2014). This sector
has been notoriously difficult to decarbonise prior to the availability
of electric vehicles, as improvements in vehicle efficiencies have been
to a large extent offset by an increase in vehicle size in the recent
past. A lot of effort has been put in France and in the EU to support
the production and purchase of electric vehicles. Efforts in France
have included a ``bonus-malus'' policies with heavy petrol and diesel
vehicles taxed more with funding redirected towards smaller and
low-emissions vehicles, an EV leasing scheme to help low-income
households, EV quotas were put on vehicle fleet of larger businesses,
and support was provided for the deployment of electric charging
points. In the short-term, the electrification of vehicles can only
account for around 3 MtCO\tsub{2}e (20\%) of the decarbonisation of
the sector so far (estimated here based on emissions substitution at
constant demand level). Other factors include possible restructuration
of working patterns post-COVID reducing transport demand, and an
economic downturn reducing transport demand of heavy goods vehicles
(HGVs). Nevertheless, the assessment of the HCC is that the main
surface transport sub-sectors (cars, vans and HGVs) have all begun to
decarbonise their fleet by electrifying their vehicles, even though
other levers influencing miles traveled have not been identified and/or
mobilised substantially so far \citep{HCC2024b,HCC2024a}. There is an important
potential to go further and faster in this sector by leveraging further
existing policies \citep{HCC2025}. 

Emissions from agriculture decreased 10 MtCO\tsub{2}e (${-}12\%$) in the
past decade. About one third of this decrease comes from decreases
associated with \mbox{reduced} use of fertilisers. Policies and incentives at
the national and European levels will have helped to drive this change,
but the pressure of inflation raising the costs of fertilisers also
played a role. The largest share of emissions reductions in this sector
comes from reduced animal farming resulting from economic difficulties
external to climate policy \citep{HCC2024b}.
Climate policies themselves are thought to be little effective in this
sub-sector, because they suffer from the lack of integration with food,
agriculture, and environment policies, leading to a situation where
climate policies put on farmers are faced with blockages from
intermediate actors of the food system (including the food industry,
distribution, and restauration) where inertia favours
emissions-intensive foods to the detriment of low-carbon and healthy
production and consumption offer \citepalias{HCC2024b}. Given
the sector is particularly exposed to climate impacts, a systemic
approach is needed to protect and support agricultural communities
within a framework that also decreases its emissions. Agroecological
practices can help to reconcile production with reduced emissions and
carbon storage \citep{HCC2024b,HCC2024a} within a broader food-systems
approach. Current policy developments in response to difficulties in
the sector are working to slow down decarbonisation and the adaptation
actions needed to increase the resilience of the sector to climate
impacts \citep{HCC2025}. 

Emissions from industry decreased 25 MtCO\tsub{2}e (${-}28\%$) in the
past decade. All eight industry sub-sectors contributed to this
decrease. Over the past decade, the structure of the economy can
account for a decrease in emissions of 10\% \citep{HCC2024b,HCC2024a}, so just under
one third of the total decrease of the sector. Hence the majority of
the decrease in emissions can be attributed to meaningful factors,
including energy and material efficiencies incentivised by the ETS and
other policies supporting the use of electricity or low carbon heat.
Generally high costs of energy in recent years will also have led to
savings and efficiency. France has put in place roadmaps to decarbonise
industry sub-sectors, which have been co-constructed with relevant
industry actors. It has also put in place contracts to decarbonise the
four sub-sectors and the 50 most polluting sites in France with the
objective of reducing industry emissions at least 45\% from 1990 level
by 2030. France also launched a ``Sufficiency Plan'' in 2022 (``Plan de
sobri\'{e}t\'{e}''), aimed at reducing energy use and waste, which
included many structural measures to encourage and promote reduced
energy use in industry. Emissions from the waste sector, in contrast,
have barely decreased in the past decade (0.5~MtCO\tsub{2}e;
${-}3.3\%$). 

Emissions from buildings decreased 32 MtCO\tsub{2}e (${-}36\%$) in the
past decade. Reductions took place in both residential and
non-residential buildings. Emissions in that sector overwhelmingly
originate from heating. Government policies have provided a lot of
support to decarbonise heating, leveraging in particular post-COVID
economic stimulus to boost financial support over multiple years.
Public support has been successful in substituting oil and gas boilers
for electric heat pumps, leading to 1 million heat pumps installed
every year since 2020. Regulations have also been enacted on energy
standards in new buildings. The government's Sufficiency Plan also
provided incentives to reduce energy demand in buildings through
infrastructure adjustments and guidance on ambient temperature and
other low-energy practices. Support for energy efficiency measures
(such as insulation) has been less substantial and stable, with
multiple changes in regulations and funding that have reduced clarity
for the industry and consumers. Energy efficiency measures are thought
to be essential to reduce total electricity demand and reach net zero
emissions by 2050 \citep{HCC2024a}. Reduced winter heating demand due to a
warming climate can account for approximately 4 MtCO\tsub{2}e of the
decrease in emissions in the past decade only (based on the correlation
between heating degree days (HDD) and building emissions, and IEA data
\citep{IEA2022}). 

Emissions from the energy sector decreased 19~MtCO\tsub{2}e (${-}37\%$)
in the past decade. This sector continues to decarbonise, supported by
national and European policies to reduce the use of coal for
electricity and to gradually develop low-carbon or electric urban heat
networks. France has announced the end of coal use in power for a long
time, but is facing difficulties in materialising this commitment both
because of the lack of suitable preparation to deal with peak
electricity demand during winter and from just transition difficulties
that come with industry closures. However the primary challenge for
reducing the sector's emissions at this point is to mitigate gas use in
electricity production. More broadly, the sector needs to expand
low-carbon electricity \mbox{generation} to support the electrification and
decarbonisation of the other sectors. Recent governments have committed
to expanding nuclear power production, but new nuclear reactors take
time to build (typically 10--15 years) and come with high uncertainties
on costs and delivery time scales. As a result of this strategy, France
faces a shortage of low-carbon electricity generation in the medium
term (5--15 years) unless it greatly expands its renewable energy
deployments and associated network infrastructure \citep{HCC2024a}. The
energy sector is also influenced by reduced winter heating demand due
to a warming climate, which can account for approximately 3
MtCO\tsub{2}{e of the decrease in emissions in the past decade in that
sector (see details above).} 

Carbon sinks from the LULUCF sector decreased 7~MtCO\tsub{2}e
(${-}15\%$) in the past decade. This was caused by important tree
mortality in forests between approximately 2013 and 2017, in response
to successive droughts made worse by climate change that have favoured
insect outbreaks (such as beetles). There is an increasing recognition
in France that forest regeneration needs to scale up to support
ecosystems and the forest-based industry. For example, France held the
``Assises de la for\^{e}t'', a sort of emergency gathering of actors
during 2021--2022 that aimed to bring to the fore the urgent needs of
the sector and identify actions that can be taken forward. Although
many actions are in progress, an overall vision has not yet emerged
that would guarantee the regeneration of the aging forest in a context
of a changing climate, with growing needs for biomass also for carbon
storage and energy uses. In parallel, France has recognised the
importance of land use changes and put in place measures to limit soil
artificialisation (i.e.\ the conversion from forest or pastures to
artificial surfaces or cropland). These policies are faced with
obstacles as they interfere with development and planning, but the
topics are very high on agendas and the climate implications of land
use change are being discussed actively. 

\section{Likelihood of France meeting its 2030 and 2050 climate
objectives}\label{mark5}

The recent rate of decarbonisation during 2019--2024 (${-}3.4$
MtCO\tsub{2}e per year on average, excluding carbon sinks), was below
what is needed to meet France's 2030 target (between ${-}16.0$
MtCO\tsub{2}e per year during 2025--2030 on average). Emissions
decreased less in 2024 (${-}6.9$ MtCO\tsub{2}e) comparatively. The
sections below assess if the framework in place is sufficient to
support continued decarbonisation of the level required up to 2030, and
if the long-term challenges to achieving net zero in 2050 are being
tackled. 

\subsection{A climate policy framework in place that needs
consolidation}\label{mark5.1}

The analysis in this section summarises the 2024 policy assessment of
the High Council on Climate \citep{HCC2024a}, and comments on difficulties
encountered in the past year that have blocked and sometimes reversed
further progress \citep{HCC2025}. The HCC set up an evaluation framework to
assess France's climate action which now includes four elements that
are scrutinised and evaluated for each sector (Table~\ref{tab1}). 

\begin{table*}
\caption{\label{tab1}Emissions and policy progress by 
sector\vspace*{2pt}}
\begin{tabular}{@{}c@{}}
\tbody
\inlinefig{fx01}
\end{tabular}
\tabnote{Emissions are shown by sector for all GHG for the last year
available (2024), with the mean change over 2019--2024 and for the year
2024 alone, compared to the rate needed over the 2025--2030 period to
meet France's 2030 target. Policy progress is assessed by the HCC by
sector for four areas based on evidence up to spring 2025
\citep{HCC2025}. Table adapted and updated from 
\citet{HCC2024a,HCC2025}.}
\vspace*{2pt}
\end{table*} 

\begin{enumerate}[(I)]
\item \textit{Governance and Strategy}. The overall governance and
strategy of climate action in France has been functional and
operational so far, with an overarching framework (SNBC, PPE, and
adaptation plans) and sectoral climate plans on how to decarbonise in
place. However, difficulties have been met to maintain good governance
and clear strategy in the long term. First, important delays have
occurred in revising the plans, which should be updated every five
years, in particular following the strengthening of objectives agreed
at the EU level and the recent politicisation of climate action
worldwide. Second, the level of ambition within sectoral plans often
doesn't match either the level of ambition of the overall target or the
level of ambition written in different laws \citep{HCC2021}. Furthermore,
setbacks in several policy instruments in 2024 and early 2025 reduced
visibility for public and private actors \citep{HCC2025}. The strategy is
thought to be most suitable for the industry sector, with action plans
for most industries in place, and committed financial support to
decarbonise the 50 most polluting sites co-developed with the
stakeholders. 

\item \textit{Public Policy Instruments}. Strategies and action
plans must be accompanied by public policy that are able to trigger
changes to the right levels and maintain them over time. Public policy
will determine the relative contributions of the public and private
sectors in the transition, the co-benefits, and will have implications
for treasury, households, businesses, jobs, and the commercial and
industrial policy of the country. Most sectors in France benefit from
incentives for action at this stage, but incentives are not all
sufficient to trigger the right level of change, particularly in the
long-term. In particular, long-term visibility on public financial
support has been fragile, reducing confidence and limiting investments.
Still, major efforts have been made in France to align national
decisions with the transition towards net zero, for example with
aspects of the stated reindustrialisation and with forest management. 

\item \textit{Adaptation}. Mitigation in some sectors will only be
possible with integrated adaptation efforts. This is mentioned as an
ambition in the draft SNBC3. The publication of the third National
Adaptation Plan (PNACC) in March 2025 based on an agreed reference
warming trajectory is a major step forward to guide adaptation
decisions. Adaptation needs are notably acknowledged for energy, where
the nuclear industry in particular takes into account a warming climate
within its planification. For other sectors, important risks persist,
which are particularly problematic in the LULUCF sector given the
recent deterioration of carbon sinks related to tree mortality made
worse by climate change. Adaptation is poorly anticipated in the
agricultural sector, which is already suffering important impacts from
weather extremes made worse by climate change. 

\item \textit{Just Transition}. Efforts have been made to take
into account the different aspects of a just transition in climate
policy, and some actions of the SNBC have a specific emphasis on
reducing impacts on vulnerable people. However, a much more systematic
effort is needed to make low-carbon choices accessible and desirable to
the majority of the population and to support households and businesses
that will be most affected by the necessary actions to tackle climate
change. 
\end{enumerate}
In addition to the policy areas above, many very practical barriers can
slow down climate actions, such as the availability of physical
infrastructure such as affordable electric vehicles and charging points
and supply chains, and social and economic organisation, such as
skills, public support, planning and procurement, and research. Most of
the barriers and enablers have been identified in the various strategic
documents published by the French government \citep{HCC2024a}. In
particular skills come out as limiting across sectors but particularly
for buildings, energy and agriculture. Barriers in the transport sector
are better anticipated than elsewhere, with a good rate of deployment
for charging stations and efforts to move markets towards an offer
based on smaller, more affordable cars. 

The public policy framework in France has constantly evolved over the
past two decades. Most evolutions have been towards a strengthening of
climate actions, with increased planning details and funding, and more
engagement with stakeholders. Despite the numerous issues identified by
the HCC and others, it is clear that successive French governments so
far have internalised the need to tackle climate change, with the
strength of public efforts heavily influenced by other priorities. The
setback of some public climate policy support in 2024--2025 reduces the
likelihood that France meets its 2030 target, but it needs to be put in
the longer-term context of growing efforts and successful
decarbonisation across sectors in the past decade (Figure~\ref{fig6}),
even though the pace is not as fast as it needs to be (Table~\ref{tab1}). 


\subsection{Meeting 2030 target is plausible for France}\label{mark5.2}

Achieving France's 2030 target of cutting its gross emissions in half
compared to 1990 requires that the level of decarbonisation observed
over 2019--2024 be enhanced by 20\% on average during 2025--2030
(Table~\ref{tab1}). The fact that most sectors are already engaged in
climate actions and that plans are in place suggests that this is
plausible \citepalias{HCC2024a}. However, the weaker decreases in emissions in
2024 (Table~\ref{tab1}) and the policy setbacks in 2024--2025 are
threatening the credibility of the 2030 target, unless the government
reacts quickly to consolidate and enhance climate policy support
\citep{HCC2025}. Most sectors have reached the level of sustained
emissions decrease needed to meet the 2030 objective, with the energy
sector outperforming on expectations (Table~\ref{tab1}). However
transport, the biggest emitting sector, is a long way behind its
objective. Although electrification of vehicles in France has picked up
more than in other neighbouring countries (e.g.\ Germany, and to a
lesser extent the UK), the 2030 objectives can only be achieved with
increased efficiency and reduced demand in addition to the
electrification of vehicles, as acknowledged in the draft SNBC3. A
rebalancing of efforts among sectors is needed to recognise the
difficulties faced by the transport sector in the \mbox{short-term} to 2030.
The strong and unexpected budget deficit that emerged in France in
mid-2024, resulted in additional uncertainty and reduced funding for
climate action, both of which will reduce the investments necessary to
decarbonise the economy in the long-term, with likely short-term effect
as well.\looseness=-1 

\subsection{Meeting net zero in 2050 will require better alignment of
actions} \label{mark5.3}

Achieving France's 2050 net zero target requires strategic plans that
go beyond the continuation and consolidation of ongoing actions. The
current strategy does not provide sufficient coherence with the needed
investments to reach net zero \citep{HCC2024a}. This is particularly the
case in the LULUCF sector with the uncertainty surrounding the
efficiency of forest carbon sinks in the context of a changing climate,
in agriculture where policies need to join up between agriculture, food
and health, and in buildings where policies need to embrace energy
efficiency more strongly in order to reduce the need for rapid
expansion of electricity generation. Difficulties in finding a pathway
to 2050 recognised in the draft SNBC3 acknowledges existing
inconsistencies between the needs for electricity generation and energy
demand, and the residual gross emissions and the availability of carbon
sinks (natural and technological). These inconsistencies will need to
be resolved within existing uncertainties, keeping multiple options
open in cases where an optimal cost-effective pathway cannot 
be found.\looseness=-1


The experience of the UK Climate Change Committee (CCC), which advises
on carbon budget levels in addition to evaluating progress, is that
identifying a realistic path to net zero requires dealing with
important uncertainties regarding the availability of low-carbon fuels
and removal technologies \citep{CCC2025a,CCC2025b}. These
options are needed to decarbonise sectors that cannot be electrified at
scale (mainly aviation, agriculture, and some process emissions). Hence
choosing between low-carbon fuels, removals, and/or demand management
to decarbonise difficult sectors will only be possible as technologies
develop and their limitations and costs become clear. The CCC also
found that net zero emissions could be achieved within the land sector
(agriculture and carbon sinks from LULUCF) independently of the wider
economy. This opens up opportunities to design targeted policy
incentives for landowners to manage their carbon balance and help reach
net zero in the combined land sectors. Finally, in its advice for the
level of the UK 7th Carbon Budget covering the 5-year period around
2040  \citep{CCC2025a,CCC2025b}, the CCC established that its pathway
should be limited to 87\% of 1990 emissions levels (90\% when excluding
emissions from international shipping and aviation). The UK has cut its
\mbox{emissions} by 50\% between 1990 and 2024
\citep{CCC2025a,CCC2025b}, compared to 37\% for France (based on
\citet{Citepa2025}, Secten data, including LULUCF) and the EU (year
2023; \citep{EuropeanCommission2024}). Hence achieving a 90\% decrease
in emissions in the EU by 2040, proposed by the European Commission,
would require measures that go much beyond those included in the CCC
advice \citep{CCC2025a,CCC2025b}.

\section{Discussion}\label{mark6}

The example of France shows that public action on climate change has
iteratively evolved in the country to produce a large number of
strategic documents involving many different public and private actors,
and multiple policy instruments that are more or less successful.
Whereas it is easy to find gaps and inefficiencies in the overall
evaluation of this framework, it is clear that public support for
climate action has been the primary cause of the decreases in emissions
in France which have been sustained over the past 20 years. Given this
has been an iterative process, the risk of reversal of climate actions
through successive decisions leading to reduced rates of
decarbonisation is very real, in a context of reduced disposable
income, political fragmentation, and the diffusion of misinformation
and disinformation on social media. Hence the continued and broad
support for climate policies that exist in France and worldwide today
\citep{Andreetal2024} is essential. Acknowledging in public and private
discourses that climate action is necessary to protect households and
businesses and essential to prosperity would help enhance climate
policy support, and better align government actions with the
expectations of populations.

Public action on adaptation is equally important to public action on
mitigation discussed here. This is especially true as climate impacts
from heat extremes, intense rainfall and floods, sea-level rise, and
all their associated impacts will continue to rise for several decades
until net zero CO\tsub{2} emissions are reached globally.
Climate-related impacts combine with natural variability so that
extreme conditions continue to intensity \citep{Ribesetal2022}.
France is particularly exposed to a range of climate impacts,
with an extended coastal region (including in the overseas territory),
dry Mediterranean climate exposed to intense rainfall and wildfires, an
extended forest area, and mountainous regions which are a source of
economic activity. At present, France tends to be functioning more on a
reactive basis to extreme climate and weather events, with insufficient
attention and resources put into planning and incorporating climate
trends, including growing climate and weather extremes, into its
planning at multiple levels
\citep{HCC2023a}. The
adoption of a reference trajectory for climate change reaching
4~\textdegree C in France is a positive step that will allow actors to
scale their adaptation needs, as is the publication of the third
revision of France's adaptation plan. However, adaptation actions need
to also be guided by regular reassessments of risks for France induced
by climate change \citep[e.g.][]{CCC2022}. With
the latest such assessment for France dating to more than a decade
\citep{Jouzel2010},
economic sectors need to be better informed about the growing risks
faced by their industry. Much more is needed to expand adaptation
policy and support across all sectors of the economy to make France
more resilient to the growing impacts of climate change.\looseness=-1

More broadly, tackling climate change requires that CO\tsub{2}
emissions reach net zero (with any remaining gross emissions
compensated by removals) alongside substantial decreases in other
greenhouse gases (GHG), in particular methane. As global emissions have
not yet peaked but individual countries progress towards the
implementation of climate actions, it is fundamental that insights and
lessons learned be shared broadly to help entrain the broadest possible
level of action. This can be done for example by dedicated support
through networks such as the International Climate Council Network
(ICCN). Climate responses need to take place and be resilient to the
ups and downs of the world economy, emerging technologies (e.g.\ AI),
and other social and security risks. Informed actions will help deliver
good outcomes on multiple priorities.

Tackling GHG emissions across the economy has been daunting. Evidence
provided here suggests that an important level of action is needed to
achieve economy-wide decreases in emissions, with actions diffused
across all sectors concerned and involving public and private actors,
helped by support at the highest level as well as insights from the
population. While these elements may not be all necessarily, and some
actions may be redundant or suboptimal, the fact the so-called
ecological transition (which is largely centred around tackling climate
change) has been a stated central priority in France is evident and has
certainly entrained key actors in the transition. Maintaining this
level of priority for the next two decades is now the challenge.


\section*{Acknowledgements}
The findings summarised in
Sections~\ref{mark2.1},~\ref{mark3}--\ref{mark5} draws on the work of
the High Council on Climate (HCC; which I chaired until June 2024) but
do not necessarily represent the exact views of the HCC. I refer you to
its reports for the formal and latest evaluation of France's public
action on climate and for associated recommendations. I sincerely thank
all the members of the HCC who have shared their experience and
insights to establish the HCC, develop its evaluation framework, and
assess policies and actions based on the best available data and
information. I thank the secretariat of the HCC and in particular its
directors for their dedication and professionalism. I thank C. Guivarch and
S. Mondon for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Finally, I
thank my colleagues at the Global Carbon Budget for providing global
and national-based CO\tsub{2} emissions used in
Sections~\ref{mark2.2}--\ref{mark2.4}, in particular R. Andrews, G.
Peters, M.W. Jones and P. Friedlingstein. I am funded by the UK's Royal
Society through a Research Professorship (grant RSRP\textbackslash
R\textbackslash 241002).

\section*{Declaration of interests}
The author is a member of the scientific advisory council of
Soci\'et\'e G\'en\'erale. This institution had no role in the
preparation of this review article.

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